Research on incentive mechanism under multi-demand-side cooperation in logistics service supply chain
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摘要: 基于共同代理理论，分别构建序次合作机制和同盟合作机制下的激励模型，并进行仿真分析. 研究表明，序次合作机制下，物流服务需求方序次与物流服务集成商签约，先与物流服务集成商签约的一方容易处于不利地位. 同盟合作机制下，物流服务需求方统一与物流服务集成商签约，物流服务集成商提供的最优努力水平的上限要高于序次合作机制下其提供的最优努力水平的上限.Abstract: Based on the theory of common agency, incentive models for sequential cooperation mechanisms and alliance cooperation mechanisms were constructed, and simulation analysis was conducted. Research result show that under the sequential cooperation mechanism, the logistics service demander signs contracts with the logistics service integrator, and the party who signs with the logistics service integrator first is likely to be at a disadvantage. Under the alliance cooperation mechanism, logistics service demanders sign contracts with logistics service integrators, and the upper limit of the optimal effort level provided by logistics service integrators is higher than the upper limit of the optimal effort level provided by them under the sequential cooperation mechanism.
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图 1 不同合作情形下LSSC示意图
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of LSSC under different cooperation situations
图 2 情形1下
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ 对激励系数的影响（序次合作）Figure 2. Influence of
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ on motivation coefficient for case 1 (sequential signing)
图 3 情形1下
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ 对激励系数的影响（同盟合作）Figure 3. Influence of
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ on motivation coefficient for case 1 (alliance signing)
图 4 情形2下
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ 对激励系数的影响（序次合作）Figure 4. Influence of
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ on motivation coefficient for case 2 (sequential signing)
图 5
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ 对激励系数的影响（同盟合作）Figure 5. The influence of
$ \mathit{\gamma } $ on the motivation coefficient (alliance signing)
图 6
$ {\mathit{e}}_{1}^{\mathit{*}} $ 变化的趋势（序次合作）Figure 6.
$ {\mathit{e}}_{1}^{\mathit{*}} $ Trend of change (sequential signing)
图 7
$ {\mathit{e}}_{1}^{\mathit{*}\mathit{*}} $ 变化的趋势（同盟合作）Figure 7.
$ {\mathit{e}}_{1}^{\mathit{*}\mathit{*}} $ Trend of change (alliance signing)
图 8
$ {\mathit{e}}_{2}^{\mathit{*}} $ 变化的趋势（序次合作）Figure 8.
$ {\mathit{e}}_{2}^{\mathit{*}} $ Trend of change (sequential signing)
图 9
$ {\mathit{e}}_{2}^{\mathit{*}\mathit{*}} $ 变化的趋势（同盟合作）Figure 9.
$ {\mathit{e}}_{2}^{\mathit{*}\mathit{*}} $ Trend of change (alliance signing)表 1 情形1下参数设置
Table 1. Parameter setting for case 1
参数 数值 $ {x}_{1} $ 1 $ {x}_{2} $ 0.5 $ {\sigma }_{1}^{2} $ 1.3 $ {\sigma }_{2}^{2} $ 1.5 k 0.4 ρ 1 $ \gamma $ [−1,1] 
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表 2 情形2下参数设置
Table 2. Parameter setting for case 2
参数 数值 $ {x}_{1} $ 1 $ {x}_{2} $ 1.5 $ {\sigma }_{1}^{2} $ 1.3 $ {\sigma }_{2}^{2} $ 1.1 k 0.4 ρ 1 $ \gamma $ [−1,1]
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表 3 参数设置
Table 3. Parameter setting
参数 数值 $ {x}_{1} $ 1 $ {x}_{2} $ [0.5,1.5] $ {\sigma }_{1}^{2} $ 1.3 $ {\sigma }_{2}^{2} $ 1.3 k 0.4 ρ 1 $ \gamma $ [-1,1]
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